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Jn the past, private nuisance had been burdened with 
performing two functions: balancing property rights, and 
compensating physical injuries. The former was an 
important element in the protection of property. The latter 
crossed into the path of negligence. 
This paper examines the House of Lords decision in the 
private n71isance case of Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd. In 
this case, the speeches of Lord Goff and Lord Hoffmann 
("the majority") reflected a vision of tort where liability 
for all physical damage to land and personal injury is 
governed by the law of negligence. This vision is supported 
in this paper. 
Once liberated from its compensato,y function, the 
primary role of private nuisance would be to balance the 
rights of people to use their land, against the rights of their 
neighbours not to suffer interference. 
In Canary Wharf, the majority limited the right to bring 
this action, to owners, or people with exclusive possession. 
However, Lord Cooke saw merit in extending the right to 
bring this action, so as give effect to the expectations of the 
community with respect to the protection of people in their 
homes. It is submitted that the goals of systematising the 
law of tort and providing protection for people in their 
homes are not necessarily irreconcilable. Accordingly, the 
right to bring an action in private nuisance, ought to have 
extended to all people occupying land as a home. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 
approximately 14,965 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The decision of the House of Lords in Hunter v Canary Wharf 1 should be read for 
two reasons. First, it is undoubtedly the most important private nuisance decision to be 
given in recent years. The House of Lords defined the interference limb of nuisance. 
An interference must emanate from the defendant's land onto the land of the plaintiff 
to be an actionable nuisance. Only then will the rights of the competing landowners be 
balanced. As a result it may be some years before another case involving this branch of 
nuisance reaches these ju_dicial heights. 
More importantly, the decision reveals a complex interplay between two competing 
visions of the future of the law of tort. The speeches of Lord Goff and Lord Hoffmann 
("the majority") reflected a vision of tort law characterised by principled systematic 
coherence. On the other hand, the approach of Lord Cooke reflected a vision of a law 
of tort that recognised the values that ordinary people find important. 
Traditionally, the action of private nuisance had been burdened with two functions . 
The first was to balance the rights of people to use land against the rights of their 
neighbours not to suffer interference. The second was to compensate for injury. It is 
because of this latter function that all efforts to define private nuisance against a 
background of the rapacious law of negligence have proved sisyphean. The vision of 
private nuisance contemplated by the majority in Canary Wharf, redefines the role 
private nuisance in the law of tort. 
The model of private nuisance adopted by the majority was influenced by the goal 
of rationalising the law of tort so that all physical damage, whether it is to land or 
personal injury, is governed by a single principle: negligence. To accomplish this 
1 
[ l 997) l All E.R. 426 ("Canary Wharf HL") . 
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would constitute a major turning point in the law of tort. The actual case did not offer 
the opportunity to complete this goal because it only involved the determination of 
preliminary issues. However, there is merit in turning the law in this direction. 
Accordingly, the speeches of the majority indicated that this is the direction in which 
the law of nuisance is heading. 
Of the three types of potential damage in Canary Wharf, two involve actual 
material physical damage. The first was material physical damage to land. The second 
was personal injury. These two types of damage will be examined together. The third 
type of damage was interference with the use and enjoyment of land. This will be 
considered separately. 
In Part V, the approach of the Lords with respect to the recovery in private 
nuisance of material physical damage to land, will be examined. It will be 
demonstrated that, while the majority indicated that material physical damage to land 
would not feature in the future of private nuisance, Lord Cooke envisioned it 
otherwise. It will be shown that there are strong reasons to surrender this type of 
damage to negligence. 
Part VI will examine the approach of the Law Lords with respect to the recovery of 
personal injury in private nuisance. Personal injury can arise in a case of private 
nuisance in one of two ways. The injury could have occurred as a consequence of an 
actionable nuisance, or it may have occurred directly. It will be demonstrated that the 
majority considered the recovery of direct personal injury in private nuisance an 
anachronism and accordingly such recovery has been extinguished. However, the Law 
Lords left the door ajar with respect to the recovery of personal injury that interferes 
with the ability of the injured person to use and enjoy land. On the other hand, Lord 
Cooke thought that both types of personal injury should be recoverable. It will be 
argued that the appropriate legal mechanism for the determination of liability for both 
types of personal injury is negligence. 
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It follows from the model of private nmsance adopted by the majority, and 
supported in Parts V and VI, that the only work extant for private nuisance is to 
determine how much interference users of land are permitted to inflict on their 
neighbours. Part VII will examine the approach of the Law Lords with respect to the 
question of the appropriate class of people eligible to bring this type of action. The 
model adopted by the majority restricted the right to bring an action to those 
possessing a proprietary interest. In doing so, they were influenced by the traditional 
conception of private nuisance as a property tort. Lord Cooke saw the value in 
extending standing to any person who occupies the land as a home. It will be argued 
that standing should have been extended. Part VIII will examine a Roman law model 
that rationalised physical injury in the law of delict, and also permitted people other 
than owners to bring an action against their neighbours for interference. 
Before any of the above analysis can occur it will be necessary to present two 
preliminary sections. In Part II the background to the case will be presented. Part III 
will consist of a model of the institution of private property and a discussion of the 
fault principle. 
II BACKGROUND 
A Facts 
1 The circumstances 
In the late l 980's the defendants, Canary Wharf Ltd, commenced construction on 
the Canary Wharf tower in London. The tower is over 250 metres high and over fifty 
meters square. It has stainless steel cladding and metalised windows. 2 As a result of the 
construction of the tower, two actions were brought. 
2 Canary Wharf HL above n l, 683 per Lord Goff. 
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2 The claims 
a First action - television signals 
The plaintiffs in the first action were various persons who lived in what is known 
as the shadow area. They claimed that the tower blocked their television reception. 
They claimed that the interference commenced in 1989 while the building was in 
construction. It continued until an alternative relay transmitter was erected, and the 
plaintiffs tuned their televisions to it, between July 1991 and April 1992. 3 
The plaintiffs sought damages for the interference with their television reception 
for this period against Canary Wharf Ltd. They claimed that the tower constituted a 
private nuisance. Initially the plaintiffs claimed negligence but this claim was 
abandoned. 
b Second action - dust damage 
The plaintiffs in the second action claimed damages for excessive amounts of dust 
created as a result of the construction of a road by the defendants. This road was 
known as the Limehouse Link Road. The plaintiffs were residents in the area. They 
claimed in nuisance and negligence against the London Docklands Development 
Corporation. 4 
3 The issues 
The Judge at first instance made orders for the trial of a number of preliminary 
issues of law. Only two survived to be considered by the House of Lords. The first was 
3 Canary Wharf HL above n 1, 684 per Lord Goff. 
4 A claim in Rylands v Fletcher ( 1868) L.R. 3 HL 330. was originally advanced but was subsequently 
abandoned. 
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in relation to the first action only. The issue was whether interference with television 
reception was capable of constituting an actionable nuisance. The second issue related 
to both actions. The issue was whether it was necessary to have an interest in the 
property interfered with, or damaged, in order to sustain a claim in private nuisance. If 
so, what type of interest was sufficient. 
The issue of whether damages lay in negligence for annoyance and discomfort 
caused by dust was heard in the Court of Appeal but not the House of Lords. 
B TheLaw 
1 Television signals 
The question of whether an interference with television signals could constitute an 
actionable nuisance was considered in Bridlington Relay Ltd v Yorkshire Electricity.5 
In that case an interference with television signals was not an actionable nuisance. The 
electricity board caused the interference during an electrical operation undertaken in 
the course of erecting an overhead power line. Without laying down a rule with respect 
to television signals, the Court observed that there had been no cases where the 
interference with a purely recreational activity had been held to be a legal nuisance. 
Buckley J stated that the ability to receive television signals was not : 
so important a part of an ordinary householder's enjoyment of his property that such 
interference should be regarded as a legal nuisance. 6 
In Bridlington the interference was not caused by the mere physical presence of a 
building but by the undertaking of an electrical operation. However, interferences 
caused by the mere physical presence of buildings had been considered in cases 
concerning the blocking of prospects. Since 1610 in Aldred 's case7 it had been 
5 
[ 1965] Ch 436 ("Bridlington"). 
6 Bridlington above n5, 447. 
7 (1610) 9 Co Rep 57: 77 ER 816. 
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accepted as settled law that the mere physical presence of a building does not create an 
actionable nuisance. 
2 Standing 
Since Malone v Lasky, 8 it had been accepted as settled law that only plaintiffs with 
a proprietary interest were entitled to bring an action in private nuisance. In that case a 
husband and wife were given licence to occupy a property by the husband's employer. 
The wife was injured when a bracket supporting a water tank was dislodged due to 
vibrations caused by machinery on the adjoining premises. The Court held that the wife 
could not claim in nuisance as she did not have an interest in the land. 
C Pressure to Change 
None of the authorities could be described as recent. In the meantime nuisance had 
come under pressure to change of considerable momentum. This pressure reflected the 
rapidly changing nature of modem society and the things that people collectively 
consider worthy of protection. 
1 The importance of telecommunication 
Many argued that nuisance failed to accord proper respect to the importance of new 
interests in modem society. The right to receive television signals was one of these 
new interests. As Rosalind English asked: 
[O]ver the course of the last 40 years, the 22-inch screen has become a ubiquitous 
feature in British homes. If it is no longer a trivial part of our lives, can it be excluded 
on the basis of being a luxury?9 
8 [1907] 2 KB 141. 
9 Rosalind English 'The Tenant, his Wife, the Lodger and their Telly: a Spot of Nuisance in Docklands" 
( 1996) 59 Mod L Rev, 726, 728 ("English"). 
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English further criticised the merits of analogising television reception to prospects. 
Undoubtedly views may be a source of delight. However, for many people, television 
is the only sources of communication with the outside world. 10 
The importance of the right to receive television signals had received judicial 
recognition in Canada. In Nor-Video Services Ltd v Ontario Hydro 11 the Court refused 
to follow Bridlington. In that case the High Court of Ontario observed that, nowadays, 
television viewing is: 
an important incident of ordinary enjoyment of property and should be protected as 
such. 12 
2 Extending the standing to sue 
Pressure to alter private nmsance also arose in the arguments for extending 
standing to bring an action. It was argued that nuisance ought to be available to people 
who have an interest in land even where that interest is less than a proprietary right. 
There had been much academic commentary in favour of extending the standing to sue 
in nuisance. 13 Some going as far to describe the restriction of standing to sue as 
"senseless discrimination. " 14 
In recent case law, arguments for extending standing to sue primarily arose where 
nuisance was required to provide protection to non property owners from interferences 
in the nature of harassment. In Foster v Warblington Urban District Counci/15 the 
defendant had taken advantage of oyster ponds on a foreshore for many years. He had 
no legal title to the land. Despite this he succeeded in an action for nuisance. 
10 English above n9, 728. 
11 
( 1978) 84 DLR (3d) 22 l . 
12 Nor-Video above n 11 , 231. 
13 See for example English above n9 , 729; Elizabeth Cooke "A Development in the Tort of Private 
Nuisance" (1994) MLR, 289,293 ; Steven Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2ed Brookers, 
Wellington, 1997) 537. 
14 Professor Fleming The law of Torts (6th edn 1983) 393-394. 
15 
[ 1906] I KB 648 . 
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In Motherwell v Motherwell 16 it was held that Foster v Warblington established a 
distinction between 'one who is "merely present" and occupancy of a substantial 
nature.' In Motherwell, the defendant harassed her father, her brother and her brother's 
wife with persistent letters and telephone calls. The sister in law brought a claim in 
nuisance in her own right, despite having no proprietary interest in the family home. In 
a judgment delivered by Clement JA, the Appellant Division of the Alberta Supreme 
Court granted an injunction in nuisance. In doing so the Court relied upon the 
distinction gleaned from Foster v Warblington. 
In Khorasandjian v Bush 17 an eighteen year old woman lived with her parents in 
the family home. For many months a former friend persistently harassed her with 
telephone calls. Miss Khorasandjian had no proprietary interest in the property. Despite 
this, she sought an injunction in nuisance. Relying on Motherwell, the English Court of 
Appeal granted the injunction. The decision was not uncontroversial. Many 
commentators were concerned that once the action was severed from a proprietary 
interest there seemed no logical reason to restrict it to the home. Indeed in 
Khorasandjian the injunction extended beyond the property. 
D The Lower Courts 
1 First instance 
Judge Havery QC held that the interference with television reception was capable 
of constituting an actionable nuisance. He also held that a proprietary interest was 
required to entitle a person to sue in private nuisance. In doing so he relied on Malone 
v Laskey. 
16 
[ l 977] 73 DLR (3d) 62. 
17 [1993] 3 WLR476. 
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2 The English Court of Appeal 
a Television reception 
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of Judge Havery on the first issue. 18 Pill 
LJ distinguished Nor- Video in that, in that case, the interference was not caused by the 
mere physical presence of a building. 19 He then drew an analogy between television 
signals and prospects. 20 It followed that the mere physical presence of a building in the 
line of sight between a television transmitter and other properties was not actionable as 
an interference with the use and enjoyment of land. 
b Standing to sue 
The Court of Appeal also reversed the decision of Judge Havery on the second 
issue. Pill LJ relied on Khorasandjian. He went one step further and attempted to 
define the relevant test. He considered that there needed to be a "substantial link" 
between the persons enjoying the use of the land and that land. In his opinion 
occupation of property as a home conferred upon an occupant a sufficient link. 21 This 
was a significant departure from the traditional approach to standing in private 
nuisance as represented by Malone v Laskey. 
c Dust 
The dust issue was disposed of by Pill LJ who held that an action for dust lay in 
negligence where there is proof of actual damage. 22 
18 
[ 1997] AC 655 ("Cana,y Wharf CA"). 
19 Cana,y Wharf CA above n 18, 664 per Pill LJ. 
2° Cana,y Wharf CA above n 18, 665 per Pill LJ. 
21 Canary Wharf CA above n 18, 675 per Pill LJ. 
22 Canary Wharf CA above n 18, 676 per Pill LJ. 
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E The Speeches of the House of Lords 
1 The majority 
a Television signals 
Like Pill LJ in the Court of Appeal, Lord Goff distinguished Nor-Video on the 
basis that it did not involve an interference resulting from the mere physical presence 
of a building. 23 He then considered whether the mere presence of a building could 
cause a nuisance. He observed that: 
[a]s a general rule, a man is entitled to build on his own land .... Moreover, as a 
general rule, a man's right to build on his own land is not restricted by the fact that the 
presence of the building may of itself interfere with his neighbour's enjoyment of his 
land. 24 
He observed that a building may spoil the neighbour's view, restrict the flow of air 
onto a neighbour's land or take away light from a neighbour's windows.25 
Nevertheless, the neighbour could not complain of the presence of the building. Lord 
Goff observed that actionable nuisances generally arose from something emanating 
from the defendants land. 
Lord Hoffmann agreed, adding that an owners right is limited by prescriptions. He 
added that the town planning regulations provided a mechanism for control of the 
umestricted right to build. In his view this was a more appropriate form of control. 26 
23 Canary Wha,fHL above n I, 685 per Lord Goff. 
24 Canary Wharf HL above n I, 685 per Lord Goff. 
25 Canary Wha,fHL above n I, 685 per Lord Goff. ote the exception in the case of an easement. 
26 Canary Wharf HL above n I, 710 per Lord Hoffmann. 
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b Standing 
The majority held that standing to sue in nuisance required a proprietary right in 
the property suffering the nuisance. They relied on Malone v Laskey. In doing so Lord 
Goff over ruled Khorasandjian. He did this by undermining the authority that 
Khorasandjian relied upon. He did not agree that Foster v Warblington stood for the 
proposition that a mere licencee was able to sue in nuisance.27 He did not elaborate this 
point but presumably this was because the plaintiff in Foster v Warblington had 
adverse possession. It followed therefore that Motherwell was wrongly decided. It also 
followed that, so far as Khorasandjian relied on Motherwell, it was also wrongly 
decided. 
Lord Hoffmann referred to a passage in Sedleigh Denfield v O Callaghan28 where 
Lord Wright referred to possession or occupation as being necessary to acquire 
standing. 29 In Lord Hoffmann's opinion, Lord Wright was referring to possession 
based upon, or derived through, title or defacto occupation. In his view, Foster v 
Warblington was a case of defacto occupation. In his opinion, even when that 
possession is wrongful against the true owner, a plaintiff with exclusive possession is 
able to bring an action in nuisance against third parties. 
Lord Hoffmann disputed that St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping 30 created two torts: 
one covering actual material damage and another covering sensible personal 
discomfort. 31 He agreed that, in the former cases, only a person with an actual interest 
in the land could sue. In his view, Khorasandjian demonstrated a tendency to extend 
standing in the latter. However, in his view they were two sides of the same tort: 
Once it is understood that nuisances productive of sensible personal discomfort do not 
constitute a separate tort of causing discomfort to people but are merely part of a single 
27 Canary Wha,fHL above n I, 691 per Lord Goff. 
28 [1940] AC 880, 902-903. 
29 Canary WharfHL above n I, 703 per Lord Hoffmann. 
30 
( 1865) 11 HL Cas 642. 
31 Canary Wha,fHL above n I, 707 per Lord Hoffmann .. 
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tort of causing injury to land, the rule that the plaintiff must have an interest in the land 
falls into place as logical, and indeed, inevitable.32 
2 Lord Cooke 
a Television signals 
12 
Like the majority, Lord Cooke held, that in this case, the interference with 
television signals was not an actionable nuisance. In his opinion, this question was 
governed by the user principle, or give and take. 33 He agreed with the rule that 
planning permission authorising a building could not authorise a nuisance. However, it 
was an important factor in determining whether nuisances caused by the presence of a 
building were reasonable in the circumstances. In this case the planning permission 
indicated that the interference with television signals was reasonable. As such it did not 
constitute a nuisance. 34 
b Standing 
Lord Cooke agreed with Pill LJ in the Court of Appeal that, in cases of interference 
with an amenity, occupancy of the home was sufficient to sue in nuisance.35 He 
approved of the distinction between those nuisances that produce actual physical 
damage and those that cause sensible personal discomfort. He drew an analogy 
between the latter cases and cases in contract where plaintiffs were able to recover for 
the partial failure to produce a promised amenity.36 Lord Cooke considered it logical 
that standing to sue in nuisance should be extended in cases involving the loss of 
amenity value. 
32 Cana,y WharfHL above n 1, 707 per Lord Hoffmann. 
33 Canary Wharf HL above n 1, 720 per Lord Cooke. 
34 Canary Wharf HL above n 1, 722 per Lord Cooke. 
35 Canary Wha,f HL above n 1, 717 per Lord Cooke. 
36 Cana,y Wha,f HL above n 1, 712 per Lord Cooke. 
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In Lord Cooke's opm10n Foster v Warblington was not misunderstood in 
Motherwell. In his opinion, Clement J in Motherwell based his reasons, not on Foster v 
Warblington, but on wider considerations relating to the family home.37 In Malone v 
Laskey the wife was dismissed by the court as a person who had "no right of 
occupation in the proper sense of the term. "38 Fletcher Moulton LJ described her as 
"merely present. "39 In the opinion of Lord Cooke, the wife received "rather light 
treatment." Such treatment was no longer acceptable today. In this respect he 
approved of Motherwell. 40 
However, Lord Cooke was not content to limit nuisance to wives. He mentioned 
Article 16 of the Convention on the rights of the Child: Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 41 All of these are aimed, in 
part, at affording protection of the home. In his view they go beyond property rights. In 
this respect he approved of Khorasandjian. 
III SIX PLAINTIFFS, TWO PARADIGMS, ONE ACTION 
In Canary Wharf, six types of claim could, potentially, have been brought relying 
on private nuisance. There were two categories of plaintiff. The first group were people 
who possess a proprietary interest in the land. This group included owners, leasees, and 
licencees with exclusive possession. The second group were people who lived with 
property owners. Included in this group were people who lived on the land as a home, 
but who did not possess a proprietary interest. Since the case decided preliminary 
issues, the Court did not hear complete facts concerning the types of damage suffered. 
However, there were three potential types of damage. These were material physical 
damage to land, interference with the use and enjoyment of land and personal injury. 
37 Cana,)' Wha,f HL above n I, 7 13 per Lord Cooke. 
38 Malone v Laskey above n8, 151 
39 Cana,y Wha,JHL above n I, 713 per Lord Cooke. 
4° Canary Wharf HL above n I , 713 per Lord Cooke. 
4 1 (1953) (Cmd. 8969). 
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The lineaments of who were to recover and who were not, depended upon the 
boundaries of private nuisance. Traditionally private nuisance had been burdened with 
dual functions. The first was to balance the rights of people to use land, against the 
rights of their neighbours not to suffer interference. The second was to compensate for 
injury. The former provided an important element in the institution of private property. 
The latter crossed over into the law of negligence. These two paradigms influence the 
operation of private nuisance, and as a result, determined who could recover. 
A A Model of Property 
Property is not a relationship between a person and a thing in the legal sense. A 
thing cannot have rights or owe obligations.42 Rather, it is a relationship between a 
person and others, whereby those others recognise that the person has certain rights 
against them in respect to a thing.43 This relationship allows people to advance their 
will in the material world through an object. In the absence of such a relationship, 
owners could not advance their will by employing the object because they could not 
guarantee that the object, or its product, would not be taken, or interfered with, by 
another. 44 In a Hobbesian world, owners could maintain the rights by threat of physical 
violence if they are tough enough. But this strategy is uncertain given that potential 
takers could gang up on a possessor.45 It is therefore a fundamental function of a legal 
system to support through its institutions the rights of the owner.46 The certainty and 
predictability that this support provides permits people to advance their will. 
But what is the institution labeled property and how is it protected? According to 
Professor Harris, the essentials of a property institution are the twin notions of 
42 Felix Cohen "Dialogue on Private Property" ( 1954) 9 Rutgers L. Rev 357, 361 ("Cohen"). 43 JW Harris Property and Justice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, I 996)("Harris"). 44 For example, from person A' s point of view, there would be no point in researching an essay on a piece of paper (her will) , if she could not be sure that she could use the piece of paper at a subsequent time. 
45 Cohen above n42, 3 71. 
46 Cohen above n42, 3 71. 
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trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum.47 The ownership spectrum describes 
various interests a person may have in a thing. According to Professor Harris, an 
ownership interest may fall anywhere on a spectrum between mere property, and full 
blooded ownership. Mere property comprises: 
some open ended set of use privileges and some open ended set of powers of control 
over uses made by others. 48 
Full blooded ownership assumes that people are entirely free to do what they will with 
the object, whether by way of use, abuse, or transfer.49 Blackstone labeled it absolute 
ownership and described it as: 
that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
uni verse. 50 
Trespassory rules are rules which purport to impose obligations on all members of 
society, other than an owner, not to make use of, or interfere with, the owned thing 
without the consent of the owner.51 Legal trespassory rules may be criminal or civil. It 
is here that the law of tort plays an important role in supporting the institution of 
property. All of the property torts, including private nuisance, are claims devised to 
support ownership interests. 52 They are all trespassory rules. As Englard observed: 
[T]ort liability has a dual task: compensation for damage and enforcement of the right 
itself. Against this background one can understand the torts of strict liability even 
where no real damage is incurred ie torts actionable per se. 53 
Englard was referring to the torts that vindicate possession, or ownership, where 
property has been taken. The right these torts protect is the right not to be dispossessed 
47 Harris above n43, 5. 
48 Harris above n43, 29. 
49 Harris above n43 , 29. 
50 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England ( 16th Edn., J Butterworth and Son, 
1825), Book 2, I . 
51 Harris above n43 , 25. These may be legal or social. 
52 Harris above n43, 34. 
53 Englard "The Law ofTorts in Israel" (1974) 22 Am J Comp L 302,311. 
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or deprived of ownership.54 However, the right to be free of damage is an important 
element of an owner's property right. It is this right that private nuisance protects. 
Where property is severely damaged, the effect may, in principle, be the same as 
dispossession. 
But nuisance also has another function in the institution of private property. 
Contrary to Blackstone, even the fullest ownership powers and privileges are not 
completely open ended. Harris noted that ownership interests are restricted by two 
types of limitation. The first are property independent prohibitions.55 Certain actions 
are prohibited irrespective of property. As Harris observed, it is not a defense to 
murder to say "I owned the knife. "56 The second are property limitation rules. 57 These 
are rules that limit an ownership interest only. Private nuisance would be a property 
limitation if it applied to land owners only. For example, if private nuisance imposes 
strict liability on Canary Wharf Ltd because it is a land owner, when other people who 
are not asserting a property right are only liable if they are negligent, then nuisance is a 
property limitation. It is so because nuisance is specifically directed at limiting the use 
of land owners. On the other hand, if everyone faced strict liability, whether a land 
owner or not, then nuisance would be a non property prohibition. The prohibition 
would apply irrespective of property. 
B The Fault Principle 
The fault principle pronounces that there shall be no liability without fault. In 
personal torts, fault has been the recognised liability criterion.58 The traditional 
54 Where Roman law had separate and distinct actions in the law of property to vindicate these rights, 
the common law uses tort. 
55 Harris above n43 , 32. 
56 Harris above n43 , 32. 
57 Harris above n43, 33. These are not essential to a minimalist conceptualisation of the property 
institution. It is possible to imagine a system where owners were free to <lo anything they liked with 
their property so long as their actions did not breach a property independent prohibition. 
58 Peter Crane Atiyah 's Accidents. Compensation and the Law (Butterworths, London, 1993) 27, see also 
152. 
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rationale is that fault provides the moral justification for attaching liability to the 
delinquent party. As Salmond observed: 
Reason demands that a loss should lie where it falls, unless some good purpose is to be 
served by changing its incidence; in general the only purpose so served is that of 
punishment for wrongful intent or negligence. 59 
Salmond's quote highlights two important elements of tort. First, tort determines who 
should bear losses. Secondly, tort punishes morally wrong actions. These two aims 
were evident at the birth of modem negligence where in Donoghue v Stevenson, Lord 
Atkins noted that liability for negligence: 
is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrong doing for which the 
defendant must pay.60 
But what theories lie behind negligence? Two pairs of concepts feature large in tort 
theory, particularly with reference to the liability criterion for physical damage and 
personal injury. The first pair are corrective and distributive justice. The second pair 
are moral responsibility and social utility. 
1 Corrective and distributive justice 
Corrective justice focuses on undoing the wrong suffered by the plaintiff by 
compelling the defendant to pay damages. 61 What constitutes wrong is determined 
independently. Most tort scholars believe that the concept of wrong in the framework 
of corrective justice cannot be based on utilitarian grounds. 62 On the other hand, 
distributive justice requires that the innocent sufferer of loss receive compensation. 
59 Salmond (6th Edn), 12-13 . 
60 
[ 1932] AC 562, 580. 
61 Izhak Englard The Philosophy of Tort Law (University Press, Cambridge, 1993) 12 ("The philosophy 
of Tort Law"). 
62 The philosophy of Tort Law above n6 l, 12. 
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When viewed independently of corrective justice, it becomes obvious that the 
compensation need not originate with the defendant. 63 
Negligence cannot claim to deliver unequivocally either corrective or distributive 
justice.64 By using fault as the criterion for liability, negligence theoretically focuses on 
corrective justice.65 But this point is overstated. Negligence may provide more than 
corrective justice alone. In practice the moral rationale is contradicted by the 
objectivity of the reasonably forseeability test. 66 Further, vicarious liability casts 
liability on an employer even when the employer is blameless. Negligence is more 
distributive than it appears at first blush. 
2 Social utility and moral responsibility 
The moral analysis of tort focuses on the suffering and doing of wrongs. 
Defendants are liable if they commit a wrong against a plaintiff, causing that plaintiff 
loss.67 Moral responsibility is generally equated with blameworthiness. The moral 
analysis focuses exclusively upon the plaintiff and the defendant. 68 On the other hand, 
arguments in favour of social utility seek to determine liability on external grounds. 
These grounds are inevitably utilitarian. The utilitarian perspective argues that liability 
criterion should advance overall social utility. Accordingly, this perspective views tort 
law as an instrument for the delivery of external goals, such as compensation, 
deterrence, loss spreading, cheapest cost avoidance and wealth maximisation. 69 Tort 
law matters only to the extent that it advances or frustrates these social goals. 
63 AI Ogus " Limits of liability for Compensation" in L Furmston (ed) The Law of Tort (Duckworth & 
Co Ltd , London I 986) 211, 213. 
64 The Philosophy of Tort Law above n62, 24. 
65 The Philosophy of Tort Law above n62. 24. 
66 The Philosophy of Tort Law above n62, 21. 
67 E Weinrib "The Special Morality of Tort Law" ( 1989) 34 MCGill L Jn! 403,408 ("Weinrib"). 
68 Weinrib above n67 , 412. 
69 The Philosophy of Tort Law above n62, 8. 
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There is a divergence of opinion concemmg the extent to which negligence 
deviates from a strict moral criteria. 7° Clearly negligence sits somewhere on a spectrum 
between moral responsibility and social utility. Weinrib argues that negligence 
perfectly matches the structural requirements of corrective justice and as such advances 
moral responsibility. 71 However, it is clear that in employing objective reasonableness, 
negligence diverges, if only slightly, towards considerations of social utility. 
IV DIFFERING MODELS OF PRIVATE NUISANCE OFFERRED BY THE 
MAJORITY AND LORD COOKE 
As a general rule, a person is able to recover in negligence for any type of material 
physical damage or personal injury that is reasonably forseeable. 72 In the past, nuisance 
had preferred certain categories of people by affording them extra protection. There are 
two aspects to this preference. The first is the class of people who were preferred. The 
second is the way in which they were preferred. In the past, private nuisance had 
provided extra protection in two ways. First, it had provided stricter liability for 
material physical damage to land and personal injury. Land owners who suffered these 
types of damage received distributive justice. Secondly, the interference limb had 
permitted recovery for harm less than personal injury. 
Whether or not the six types of plaintiff were able to recover depended upon the 
approach the Lords took to who was to be preferred, and how. 
A The Model Adopted by the Majority 
There were, primarily, two influences on the shape of the model of nuisance 
adopted by the majority. The first was the traditional shape of private nuisance. This 
7° Compare G Fletcher "Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory" (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 537 with Weinrib 
above n67. 
71 The Philosophy of Tort Law above n62, 24. 
72 See Donoghue v Stevenson above n60. 
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influenced the class of people who were permitted extra protection. The majority 
restricted the class of people preferred, to those with proprietary interests ("owners"). 
The second was the goal of rationalising the law of tort so that all physical damage 
is controlled by negligence. This affected the scope of that protection. By indicating 
that material physical damage to land and personal injury should be severed from 
private nuisance, the majority advocated reducing the extra protection nuisance could 
offer owners. The only extra protection extant, would be from interferences with use 
and enjoyment. 
In their decision to prefer only owners, both Lord Goff and Lord Hoffmann were 
influenced by "The Boundaries of Nuisance" by Professor Newark. 73 Newark observed 
that the essence of nuisance was that it was a tort directed against the plaintiffs 
enjoyment of rights over land. 74 Professor Newark noticed that the historical origin of 
the tort lay in the fact that: 
Disseisina, transgressio and nocumentum [nuisance] covered the three ways in which 
a man might be interfered with in his rights over land. Wholly to deprive a man of the 
opportunity of exercising his rights over land was to disseise him, for which he might 
have recourse to the assize of novel disseisin. But to trouble a man in the exercise of 
his rights over land without going so far as to dispossess him was a trespass or a 
nuisance according to whether the act was done on or off the plaintiffs land. 75 
It followed from the analysis provided by Professor Newark, that an action in private 
nuisance would only lie at the suit of a person who had a right to the land affected. But 
what was the nature of this right? 
73 F.H. Newark "The Boundaries of Nuisance" ( 1949) 65 L.Q.R. 480 (" ewark"). 
74 Newark above n73, 481. 
75 Note, the three actions mentioned are all examples of trespassory rules. 
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Lord Goff held that it included any person who had a right of exclusive possession. 
This included freeholder, tenant in possession or even a licencee with exclusive 
possession. 76 Lord Hoffmann cited Lord Wright in Sedleigh Den.field who observed: 
The assizes became early superceded by the less formal procedure of an action which 
lay for damages. This action was less limited in its scope, because whereas the assize 
was by a freeholder against a freeholder, the action lay also between possessors or 
occupiers of land .... [P]ossession or occupation is still the test. 77 
Lord Hoffmann interpreted possession to refer to a right to possession based on title or 
defacto occupation. 78 Either way, they amounted to exclusive possession. 
B The Model Advanced by Lord Cooke 
Lord Cooke acknowledged that the speeches of the majority "achieve a maJor 
advance in the symmetry of the law of nuisance."79 
But he added: 
Being less persuaded that they strengthen the utility or the justice of this branch of the 
common law, I am constrained to offer an approach which, although derived from 
concepts to be found in those opinions, would lead to principles different in some 
respects . 80 
Lord Cooke envisioned a law of tort that was capable of providing legal recognition of 
the values of the community. He doubted the capability of nuisance, as restricted by the 
majority, to recognise the values people find important. He observed: 
What has made the law of nuisance a potent instrument of justice throughout the 
common law world has been largely its flexibility and versati lity.81 
76 Canary Wha,fHL above n 1, 692 per Lord Goff. 
77 Sed!eigh-Denfie!d v O 'Callaghan [ 1940] A.C. 880, 902-903 . 
78 Canary Wha,f HL above n l, 703 per Lord Hoffmann. 
79 Canary Wharf HL above n 1, 71 l per Lord Cooke. 
8° Canary Wha,f HL above n 1, 71 1 per Lord Cooke. 
81 Canary WharfHL above n 1, 71 l per Lord Cooke. 
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Lord Cooke was concerned to develop private nmsance into a tort directed at 
protecting people in their homes. He extended the class of people to be preferred to 
those who occupy the land as a home. In a sense, he began to construct a bundle of 
rights around the home. His model preferred this of class people by providing extra 
protection in two ways. First, they were able to rely on the 'interference with use and 
enjoyment' limb of nuisance to recover for harm less than personal injury. Secondly, 
they were potentially able to rely on a different liability criterion to recover personal 
· · · · · 82 mJury m pnvate nmsance. 
He proceeded to outline a nmsance that was considerably different in many 
respects from that of the majority. He did not respect the traditional boundaries of 
nuisance. As a consequence, plaintiffs suffering certain types of damage, who had 
fallen between the boundaries of nuisance and negligence in the majorities model, were 
able to recover. 
V MATERIAL PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO LAND 
The majority judgment indicated that material physical damage ought to be 
exclusively controlled by negligence. However, Lord Cooke appreciated a difference 
between strict liability for reasonably forseeable material physical damage in private 
nuisance, and liability in negligence. It is submitted that material physical damage to 
land ought not be recoverable in private nuisance. 
82 Lord Cooke's model of private nuisance preferred the owner of land for material physical damage to 
land. For this damage, only the owner was able to recover in nuisance. 
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A Recovery by An Owner for Material Physical Damage to Land 
I The model adopted by the majority - reasonable foresight as an element of private 
nuisance 
The recovery of damages in nuisance for material physical damage to land was not 
expressly considered in the speeches of the House of Lords. Unfortunately, this meant 
that their Lordships were not called upon to venture an opinion on two current issues. 
The first was the role that negligence plays in nuisance as it applies to cases of material 
physical damage to land. The second was whether the material physical damage limb 
of nuisance still exists .at all , or whether actual damage is now exclusively the 
province of negligence. However, it can be shown that, in the model favoured by the 
majority, there is very little difference between liability in the claim of negligence and 
liability for reasonably forseeable damage in private nuisance. 
Through an action of nuisance, plaintiffs are able to access the most powerful 
remedies the common law possesses: damages and injunction. Yet the common law has 
struggled in its attempts to determine a balance between the right of property owners to 
obtain compensation for actual damage to their land, and the principle that a defendant 
shall not be liable without fault. Actual damage as a result of a one off occurrence 
resembles the types of cases normally controlled by negligence. This has lead to much 
confusion with respect to the elements of nuisance as it applies to actual damage. In 
The Wagon Mound (No.2) 83 Lord Reid, delivering a speech in the Privy Council , 
observed that "[a]lthough negligence may not be necessary, fault of some kind is 
almost always necessary and fault generally involves forseeability." 84 
83 Overseas Tanks hip (UK) Ltd v Miller Steamship Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (no. 2))[ 1967] l AC 617 
(" The Wagon Mound") . 
84 The Wagon Mound above n83 , 639. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF W~LLINGTON 
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Lord Reid went on to say: 
It is not sufficient that the injury suffered by the respondents ' vessel was the direct 
result of the nuisance if that injury was in the relevant sense unforseeable. 85 
24 
Although this was obiter dictem, it has been widely accepted as the settled law on 
the point. 86 In Cambridge Water87 Lord Goff expressed the view that Lord Reid was 
referring to remoteness. As Lord Goff observed: 
It is still the law that the fact that the defendant has taken all reasonable care will not 
of itself exonerate him from liability, the relevant control mechanism being found 
within the principle of reasonable user. But it by no means follows that the defendant 
should be held liable for damages of a type which he could not reasonably forsee. 88 
It appears that, defendants are only liable for reasonably forseeable circumstances in 
private nuisance: but they are liable even when they take care. 
In cases of material physical damage to land, liability in negligence and nuisance 
will rarely differ. When defendants do not bother to take care to avoid reasonably 
forseeable damage they will be liable in both negligence and nuisance. But will there 
be a difference when the defendants take care? Imagine Canary Wharf Ltd had taken 
care not to create dust. Despite this, dust is created causing damage to the cladding of a 
plaintiffs house. This was reasonably forseeable. As a result of the dust, a drain 
blocked. The ensuing flood, damaged the plaintiffs prize roses. This could not have 
been reasonably forseen. Assume causation is clearly established. Canary Wharf Ltd 
will not be liable for the roses in negligence since that damage was not reasonably 
forseeable. The Wagon Mound establishes that Canary Wharf Ltd will not be liable for 
the roses in nuisance for the same reason. Moreover, Canary Wharf Ltd will not be 
liable for the cladding damage in negligence if in taking care, they reached a certain 
standard of conduct. They will also escape liability in nuisance, if they can show that 
85 The Wagon Mound Above n83, 640. 
86 Cambridge Water Co. Ltd v Eastern Counties l eather Pie [ 1994] 2 WLR 537, 538 ("Cambridge 
Water" ) per Lord Goff. 
87 Cambridge Water above n86, 537 . 
88 Cambridge Water above n86, [ 1994] 2 A.C. 264, 300. 
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they took precautions to the point that dust damage was no longer reasonably 
forseeable. It follows that there will be little practical difference between the two 
actions in this context. 
The introduction of negligence as a liability element in nuisance has caused many 
to question whether the actual damage limb of nuisance ought to exist at all. In Canary 
Wharf, Lord Goff referred to "The Place of Private Nuisance in the Modem Law of 
Torts" by Conor Gearty. 89 Gearty argued that physical damage should be left to 
negligence. He argued that this: 
will enable nuisance. to tum its undivided attention to what it does best, protecting 
occupier against non physical interference with the enjoyment of their land.90 
Gearty claimed that in many of the cases involving actual damage for a one off event, 
nuisance had been the theoretical basis of liability, but negligence had been the driving 
force. He argued that the occasional categorisation of physical harm as nuisance is 
anomalous: 
The breadth of negligence was not fully understood in the nineteenth century or even 
in the first half of the twentieth, and nuisance provided a superficially attractive 
receptacle for cases that were otherwise hard to classify.91
 
Lord Goff did not express an opinion on this thesis directly. But the position of the 
majority on this point is not entirely unclear. In Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd9
2 
Lord Goff found it "difficult to believe" that there could "be any material distinction 
between liability in nuisance and liability in negligence." Moreover, in Canary Wharf 
he observed: 
89 Conor Gearty "The Place of Private Nuisance in the Modem Law of Torts" [ I 989] CU 214 
("Gearty"). 
90 Gearty above n89, 218. 
91 Gearty above n89, 218. 
92 [1987] AC 241,274. 
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In any event it is right for present purposes to regard the typical cases of private 
nuisance as being those concerned with interference with the enjoyment of land .... 
Characteristic examples of cases of this kind are those concerned with noise, 
vibrations, noxious smells and the like. 
93 
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As Professor Newark demonstrated, material physical damage to land had always 
been recoverable in nuisance. The Law Lords were unable to expressly alter this rule 
because the facts did not involve material physical damage. As a result this principle is 
extant. However, Canary Wharf indicates that the model of tort adopted by the 
majority may not retain material physical damage to land in nuisance for much longer. 
2 The model advanced by Lord Cooke - nuisance and negligence concurrently 
available 
Whether or not the liability criterion for material physical damage to land in the 
model advanced by Lord Cooke was reasonable foresight is unclear. In one part if his 
speech, Lord Cooke approved of a statement made by Lord Wilberforce in Goldman v 
Hargreave to the effect that: 
the tort of nuisance, uncertain in its boundary, may comprise a wide variety of 
situations, in some of which negligence plays no part, in others of which it is 
d 
. . 94 
ec1s1ve. 
In another part of his speech he refers to the: 
identification in Cambridge Water . .. of reasonable foresight of damage as an essential 
ingredient of liability.95 
Lord Cooke found Conor Gearty's view that material physical damage should be 
exclusively governed by negligence "striking."96 Clearly, he appreciated a material 
difference between strict liability for reasonably forseeable harm in nuisance, and 
93 Canary Wha,fHL above n I, 692 per Lord Goff. 
94 
[ 1967] 1 AC 645, 657. 
95 Canary Wharf HL above n 1, 719 per lord Cooke. 
96 Canary WharfHL above n I, 712 per Lord Cooke. 
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liability in negligence. Plaintiffs who are unable to rely on negligence may rely on 
private nuisance to recover damages for material physical damage to land. 
Lord Cooke once quoted with approval the following statement of Lord Goff: 
If I was asked what is the most potent influence upon a court in formulating a 
statement of legal principle, 1 would answer that in the generality of instances it is the 
desired result in the particular case before the court.97 
This could not be true of the speech of Lord Cooke in Canary Wharf because he agreed 
with the result reached by the majority. However, given his references to justice and 
utility, it is clear that he appreciated that a protean nuisance action is more capable of 
assisting courts to reach desired results. 
3 Professor Harris' Model as it applies to material physical damage to land m 
nuisance 
Material physical damage to land should be exclusively governed by negligence. 
Reasonable foresight is the appropriate liability criterion for material physical damage 
to land for a number of reasons. First, it is simpler and easier to justify when liability 
for all material physical damage is determined according to one criterion. It has a 
principled coherence that does not favour one type of damage over another. 
97 The Rt Hon. Lord Cooke of Thomdon KBE The Hamlyn l ectures-Turning Points of the Common 
law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997). 
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As professor Atiyah observed: 
[P]rinciples .. . give some overall structure or rational shape to the law, not just in the 
interests of elegance, but in the interests of consistency, of the desire to ensure that 
like is treated alike.98 
28 
Secondly, the introduction of reasonable foresight into nuisance aligns property rights 
with personal rights. Professor Harris' model of the property institution can be used to 
demonstrate this point. 
Negligence already controls liability in most fact situations that do not involve 
competing property rights. According to Professor Harris ' model of the property 
institution, negligence is a property independent prohibition.
99 People are not permitted 
to cause reasonably forseeable damage of any type, whether it emanates from their land 
or not. For example, imagine the facts of Canary Wha,fbut add an extra defendant. A 
truck driver drives past emitting hazardous smoke, causing material damage to the 
plaintiff's land and personal injury to the plaintiff. The truck driver is unrelated to 
Canary Wharf Ltd. The truck driver is liable in negligence for the damage and injury, 
only when he intended the damage or was negligent. There is a general property 
independent prohibition against intentionally or negligently damaging the property of 
others, or injuring others. It is the tort of negligence. 
Conversely, the plaintiffs are liable for any damage inflicted on the truck driver 
only when they intended the damage or they are negligent. The same property 
independent prohibition applies. It applies whether the plaintiffs inflicted the damage 
directly, or it merely came from their land. Therefore, it cannot be said that the policy 
of the law prefers the property owner. 
98 P.S. Atiyah The Hamlyn l ectures-Pragmatism and Theory in English l aw (Stevens & Sons, London, 
1987). 
99 Harris above n43 , 25 . 
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Private nuisance is different because it balances competing property rights. '00 As a 
result, it provides a trespassory rule for plaintiffs, as well as a property limitation rule 
imposed on defendants. As Harris observes: 
In common law systems, a land owners use privileges are limited by the tort of 
nuisance. He is prima facie entitled to do what he likes on and with his own land, but 
not if that would cause unacceptable harm to his neighbours. 101 
Private nuisance, therefore, does two things. First, it defines the uses owners may 
make of their land by defining the property limitations provided by tort. In this case, it 
determines whether or not Canary Wharf Ltd may undertake activities that cause dust. 
Secondly, it vindicates the plaintiffs property right. As Englard observed: 
The existence of a right is to be inferred indirectly from the protection it is given from 
invasion. Thus the right is a function of and co-extensive with the remedy and is not to 
be defined other than through its scope of protection (ubi remedium, ibi ius). 102 
Applying Englard's notion to Canary Wharf, the extent of the right of owners not 
to suffer material physical damage to their land, will depend on the trespassory 
protection available to them. From the perspective of vindicating the right to be free of 
land damage, there can be no argument against negligence. The other property torts are 
strict because they protect the right of possession or ownership. 103 Private nuisance 
merely protects against damage. In cases involving personal injury or chattel damage, 
the policy of the law has been to protect the plaintiff only to the extent that the 
tortfeasor was at fault. In other words, people who suffer personal injury on a public 
street resulting from the dust from Limehouse Link Road, only have the right to be free 
of personal injury to the extent that the defendant was negligent. Why should the right 
not to suffer material physical damage to land be better protected than the right not to 
suffer personal injury? To retain strict liability on the basis of vindicating the right to 
100 It is generally accepted that nuisance operates when the damage complained of originates on the land 
of the defendant. For example see Miller v Jackson [ 1977] QB 966, 980 per Lord Denning MR "it is the 
very essence of a private nuisance that it is the unreasonable use by a man of his land to the detriment of 
his neighbour." 
101 Harris above n43, 34. 
102 Englard "The Law of Torts in Israel" above n53, 311. 
103 Englard "The Law of Torts in Israel" above n53, 311. 
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be free of property damage, would be to prefer property rights to personal rights. This 
is an indefensible proposition. From this perspective, introducing negligence as the 
liability criterion, aligns material physical damage to land with personal injury and 
chattel damage. 
On the other hand, from the perspective of property limitations, there may be 
reasons to retain strict liability. '
04 Nuisance and negligence are concurrently available. 
Theoretically, strict liability could make Canary Wharf Ltd liable even when they take 
reasonable precautions in the use of their property. Arguably, Canary Wharf Ltd would 
undertake fewer risky ventures if they knew that liability for material physical damage 
to land was strict. The question is whether there are any reasons to retain strict liability 
on the grounds that it reduces use privileges? 
As Lord Cooke observed in Canary Wharf 
the lineaments of the law of nuisance were established before the age of television and 
radio, motor transport and aviation, town and country planning, a "crowded [sland" 
and a heightened public consciousness of the need to protect the environment.
105 
These are examples of many factors that may contribute to the argument for limiting 
the use rights of property owners such as Canary Wharf Ltd. To these may be added, 
the increasing ways in which uses of land may effect large numbers of other people, 
the pressures of increased population on land which is a finite resource, the trend 
toward urbanisation and a greater number of people owning land in smaller parcels. If 
the policy of the law was to limit the things that people can do with their land, then 
strict liability would be retained for material physical damage to land. However, it has, 
generally not been the policy of the common law to restrict the right of land owners to 
use their land. In so far as the approach adopted by the majority introduces reasonable 
forseeability, it increases the set of use privileges available to Canary Wharf Ltd. 
104 Refer Harris above n57 . 
105 Canary Wha,f HL above n I, 71 l per Lord Cooke. 
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B Recovery by a Person Living with an Owner for Material Physical Damage to 
Land 
1 The model adopted by the majority - no recovery 
In accordance with the analysis provided by Professor Newark, the majority 
denied recovery for material physical damage to land in private nuisance to people 
living with the owner. The majority preferred to endorse Malone v Laskey. 
It was argued in Canary Wha,f that spouses of the property owner ought to be able to 
recover in nuisance. 
106 T.he Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 (UK) and Family Law Act 
1996 (UK) were cited in support of this submission. However, neither Lord Goff or 
Lord Hoffmann approved of this submission. As Lord Hoffmann observed: 
The effect of these provisions is that a spouse may ... become entitled to exclusive 
possession of the home. If so she will become entitled to sue for nuisance. Until then 
her interest is analogous to a contingent reversion.
107 
2 The model advanced by Lord Cooke - no recovery 
Like the majority model, the approach advanced by Lord Cooke did not permit a 
person living with the owner to recover for material physical damage to land in 
nuisance. This is an expression of the distinction between the land as property and the 
land as a home. Material physical damage to land is damage to property and as such is 
recoverable by the owner. 
In summary, neither an owner or a person living with an owner, ought to be able to 
recover material physical damage to land in private nuisance. Professor Harris' 
property model demonstrates that reasonable foresight in private nuisance aligns 
property rights with personal rights. By the approach adopted by the majority, there is 
106 Canary Wha,fHL above n I, 708 per Lord Hoffmann. 
101 Canary Wha,f HL above n l , 708 per Lord Hoffmann. 
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no material difference between liability for reasonably forseeable damage in nuisance 
and liability in negligence. As a result, material physical damage to land should be 
controlled by negligence. 
VI PERSONALINJURY 
Personal injury can arise in a case of private nuisance in one of two ways. The 
injury can occur in connection with an actionable nuisance, or it may occur directly. 
The model of private nuisance adopted by the majority did not permit recovery for 
direct personal injury. However, personal injury was recoverable where it interfered 
with the injured party's ability to use and enjoy their land. It is submitted that personal 
injury ought not be recoverable in private nuisance by either an owner or a person 
living with an owner. 
A Recovery by An Owner for Personal Injury 
I The model adopted by the majority - no recove,y for direct personal injwy 
The majority confirmed that there can be no recovery in private nuisance for direct 
personal injury. In deciding this they were influenced by Professor Newark. Newark 
remarked that the idea that personal injury could be recovered in private nuisance 
would never have occurred to lawyers of Bracton 's day or long after. 108 The idea only 
insinuated itself as the result of some incautious obiter dictum on the part of 
Fitzherbert Jin 1535. 109 
Right from its conception, one of the property rights that nuisance protected was an 
easement. In early law the easement most effected was the right of way. To interfere 
with a right of way was a nuisance. Interference with a public right of way was an 
encroachment upon the King. This form of public nuisance was a crime. As such no 
108 Newark above n73, 482 . 
109 ewark above n73 , 482. 
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common person could recover for it. 110 Unfortunately, in an action for blocking the 
public highway, Baldwin J advanced the reasoning that if recovery for damage was 
allowed to one, it would have to be allowed to all. 111 Agreeing with this proposition, 
Fitzherbert J went on to create an exception where one person suffered special injury. 
He held, that if someone created a trench across the road so that both he and his horse 
were to fall into it, he could recover in nuisance: 
I shall have an action against him who made the trench across the road because I am 
more damaged than any other man. 11 2 
According to Newark: 
At this point we have moved into the realm of personal injuries and away from the 
original conception of nuisance as a tort to land. 113 
This case came to be used as authority for the proposition that it was possible to 
recover in nuisance for personal injury. A line of cases developed from this 
proposition. As Newark complained: 
They were all actions on the case, and an examination of the manner of the plaintiffs 
declaring makes it plain that the lawyers of that time conceived of them as actions for 
negligence . Furthermore, the cases were fought in court on the footing of negligence 
and juries were instructed in terms of negligence. 114 
However, from the mid eighteenth century these cases became increasingly pleaded as 
nuisances. Plaintiffs were able to rely on strict liability in nuisance to recover damages 
for personal injury. Newark described this as a: 
heresy which is equally offensive to the legal historian and the jurisprudent. ... A 
sulphurous chimney in a residential area is not a nuisance because it makes 
householder cough and splutter, but because it prevents them taking their ease in their 
gardens. 115 
110 Newark above n73 , 482. 
111 Y .8. 27 Hen. 8, Mich. Pl.! 0. 
112 Y.B. 27 Hen. 8, Mich. Pl 10. 
113 Newark above n73 , 483. 
114 Newark above n73, 484-485. 
11 5 Newark above n73 , 488. 
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For these reasons Newark argues that personal injury ought not be recoverable m 
nmsance. 
Lord Goff did little more than draw attention to this conclusion in his speech. 
However, he did mention that the typical cases of private nuisance were 
characteristically those concerned with noise, vibrations noxious smells and the like. 116 
Personal injury was not one of the typical nuisances he suggested. It is consistent with 
the majority's goal of rationalising all material physical damage, that personal injury 
be excluded from private nuisance. 
2 The model advanced by Lord Cooke - personal injury in private nuisance 
In a significant departure from the majority, the approach advanced by Lord Cooke 
permitted recovery for personal injury. 11 7 This undoubtedly increased the protean 
nature of private nuisance. However, it ought not be adopted for a number of reasons. 
Lord Cooke ' s first argument related to the history of nuisance. He observed that it was 
clearly established that personal injury is recoverable in public nuisance. He then states 
"as to the kind of harm actionable it would be hard to see any sensible difference 
between public and private nuisance." 118 
In his view, it was too late to rue the incautious dicta of Fitzherbert J that was 
mentioned by Professor Newark. 119 However, Lord Cooke's argument is fallacious. It 
assumes that it is appropriate to recover for personal injury in public nuisance. Like 
private nuisance, public nuisance permitted recovery for personal injury before the 
modern action of negligence existed. As Conor Gearty would argue, personal injury in 
public nuisance should also be returned to negligence.120 
116 Canary Wharf HL above n I , 692 per Lord Goff. 
117 Canary Wha,f HL above n l, 719 per Lord Cooke. 
118 Cana,y Wharf HL above n I, 7 19 per Lord Cooke. 
119 Cana0· Wha,fHL above n I, 7 18 per Lord Cooke. 
120 Refer Gearty above n89. 
THE VIEW OF PRIVATE NUISANCE FROM CANARY WHARF 35 
Secondly, Lord Cooke saw no reason to exclude personal injury from nuisance now 
that reasonable forseeability is an essential element. 121 As the majority conceives it, 
liability for reasonably forseeable damage in private nuisance is the same as 
negligence. Where this is so, private nuisance provides no extra protection and so this 
damage should be subsumed into negligence. On the other hand, Lord Cooke perceived 
a difference between strict liability for forseeable harm in nuisance and liability in 
negligence. As such private nuisance would provide extra protection. 
However, this offends the fault principle. In support of personal injury in nuisance, 
Lord Cooke referred to an article by Martin Davies entitled "Private Nuisance Fault 
and Personal Injuries." 122 Despite a lack of English authority, Davies asserted that it 
was possible to recover personal injury in nuisance. He based this assertion on a dearth 
of academic opinion. He then presented authority for the proposition that defendants 
can be liable in nuisance without fault. This lead Davies to the conclusion that personal 
injuries could be recovered in nuisance without proof of fault. 123 
Corrective justice is the dominant theory in the general policy of the law of tort 
with respect to personal injury. 124 Liability without fault in private nuisance for 
personal injury would provide owners with the benefit of distributive justice. But it 
remains to be seen why this should be so. According to Professor Harris ' property 
model, the right not to suffer personal injury is not a right attached to property. When a 
person acquires property, they do not acquire a right to be free of personal injury while 
on it. This right exists independent of the land, and as such, is governed by property 
independent prohibitions such as negligence. 
Lastly, it may be argued that nothing can be more disturbing to a land owner's 
enjoyment of his or her property than ' a broken head.' However, the same broken head 
121 Canary Wha,fHL above n l , 7 19 per Lord Cooke. Refer Cambridge Water above n86. 
122 M Davies "Private uisance, Fault and Personal Inj uries" ( 1990) 20 UW ALR l 29("Davies"). 
123 Davies above n 122, l 40. 
124 See The Philosophy of Tort Law above n61 , 12. 
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caused by a fist is no less disturbing. Yet it is not possible to bring an assault and 
b · d · 125 attery action un er nmsance. 
3 Personal injury interfering with the use of land 
Both the majority and Lord Cooke approved of the recovery in private nuisance of 
personal injury occurring in connection with an actionable interference with the use 
and enjoyment of land. It is submitted that this injury ought not be recoverable in 
private nuisance. 
Devon Lumber Co ltd v MacNeil 126 was mentioned in Canary Wha,fbecause it was 
a case in which the wife and children of a property owner were able to recover in 
nuisance. However, this case is also significant because the children recovered for 
asthma aggravated as a result of dust. In deciding the case, Stratton CJNB took it for 
granted that personal injuries were able to be recovered in nuisance. This was in full 
accord with the academic authority he cites, including Linden J who observed: 
although members of the possessor's family were once denied compen ation, it now 
appears that they may recover for personal injury resulting from private nuisance. 127 
Neither was Stratton CJNB concerned that plaintiffs are able to rely on stricter liability 
for personal injury in nuisance. He quoted Professor Fleming who noticed that denying 
wives and family access to nuisance, was: 
denying them protection against many forms of discomfort and, in ea e of personal 
injury, the benefit of potentially stricter liability for nuisance compared with 
negligence. 128 
Despite this, the plaintiffs were unable to recover for personal injury because the 
children had an abnormal sensitivity to the dust. The objective reasonableness test did 
125 ewark above n73, 488 . 
126 
( l 987) 45 DLR ( 4'h) 300 ("Devon"). 
127 Linden Canadian Tort Law (3 rd ed., Butterworths, Toronto, 1982) 549. 
128 Fleming The Law of Torts above n 14, 393-394. 
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not make a defendant liable for personal injury to a plaintiff with an extraordinary 
sensitivity. 129 
The plaintiffs did, however, recover on the grounds that the dust interfered with 
their ability to enjoy their home. As Stratton CJNB observed: 
compensation in nuisance is not dependent upon proof of physical injury. It may 
consist of the annoyance and discomfort caused to the occupiers premises. 130 
Since the dust seriously disturbed the plaintiffs enjoyment of their land, the defendant 
was required to pay damages. In this way the personal injury suffered by the plaintiffs 
whenever they tried to use their land, interfered with their use and enjoyment of that 
land. This is an approach approved by Lord Hoffmann. In his view, direct personal 
injury could not be recovered in nuisance that: 
So far as the claim is for personal injury, it seems to me that the only appropriate cause 
of action is negligence. 131 
However, in deciding whether personal injuries that interfere with the use and 
enjoyment of rights over land were recoverable, Lord Hoffmann stated that: 
[I]nconvenience, annoyance or even illness suffered by persons on land as a result of 
smells or dust are not damage consequential upon the injury to the land. It is rather the 
other way about: the injury to the amenity of the land consists in the fact that the 
persons upon it are liable to suffer inconvenience annoyance or illness.132 
It is submitted that personal injury occurring in connection with an interference 
with the use and enjoyment of land ought not be recoverable in private nuisance. 
Traditionally, private nuisance provided recovery only where the interference with the 
use and enjoyment of property was umeasonable. 133 In this context, reasonableness has 
two facets. The reasonableness of the activity, and the reasonableness of the harm 
129 Devon above n 126, 303-304. 
130 Devon above n 126, 304 
131 Cana,y Wha,fHL above n l, 707 per Lord Hoffmann. 
132 Canary Wha,f HL above n l , 706 per Lord Hoffmann. 
m See St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping above n30. 
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suffered. 134 Presumably, the same criterion would apply when the defendant's activities 
cause personal injury that interferes with the injured parties ability to use and enjoy the 
home. By this logic, liability for personal injury would be determined by the 
reasonable user principle instead of negligence. But this begs the question: by what 
criterion is reasonableness determined and how would it differ from negligence. 
If the reasonable user principle was directed at obtaining corrective justice, 
reasonableness would be determined in accordance with a moral criteria. Morality is 
generally equated with reasonable foresight. The test would employ reasonable 
forseeability to determine whether the actions of the tortfeasor were reasonable. 
Imagine that the trucks using Limehouse Link Rd, cause dust that gives the neighbours 
asthma. If the asthma was forseeable, then using the road would be unreasonable. 
There is very little practical difference between this and negligence. 
On the other hand, it was asserted in St Helens Smelting, 135 that physical damage 
was never reasonable. If this rule was applied in personal injury cases, then private 
nuisance would provide recovery whenever plaintiffs suffer physical injury. Canary 
Wharf Ltd would be liable in private nuisance for dust that caused asthma on proof of 
causation. As such nuisance would provide distributive justice. The moral 
blameworthiness of the defendant would be irrelevant. This offends the fault principle. 
Moreover, in cases involving competing property rights, external factors of social 
utility may determine what is reasonable in the reasonable user principle. In Canary 
Wharf the benefit of having the tower may be weighed against the loss of television 
reception. However, when the harm suffered was personal injury, it is unlikely that 
reasonableness would be determined without some reference to fault. It is difficult to 
imagine a test that weighs the reasonableness of driving fast down Limehouse Link Rd, 
against a broken limb, without reference to a moral criteria. Since fault is reasonable 
134 See G Cross "Does onl y the Careless Polluter Pay? A Fresh Examination of the ature of Private 
Nuisance" ( 1985) 111 LQR 445 , 450. 
135 St Helens Smelting v Tipping above n3 0. 
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foresight, it is unlikely that a personal tort of nuisance would advance social utility 
goals further than already given by negligence. 
B Recovery by a Person Living with an Owner for Personal Injury 
1 The model adopted by the majority - no recovery 
In accordance with the majority's goal of rationalising the law of tort, the majority 
model prohibited a person living with the owner from recovering damages for personal 
injury in private nuisance. Lord Goff stated: 
[I]f the other spouse suffers personal injury, including injury to health, he or she may, 
like anybody else, be able to recover damages in negligence. The only disadvantage is 
that the other spouse cannot bring an independent action in private nuisance for 
damages or discomfort or inconvenience. 136 
2 The model advanced by Lord Cooke - recovery 
The approach of Lord Cooke would permit recovery m private nuisance for 
personal injury to people living with an owner. Lord Cooke did not expressly address 
the point. But he did expressly permit recovery for chattel damage in private nuisance. 
As he opined: 
If a husband's car and his wife's are both damaged by spray from an adjacent 
property, they should alike be entitled to sue in nuisance even if he alone ha a 
proprietary interest in the land. 137 
It would be consistent with his goal of preferring people in their homes by providing 
them with extra protection, to extend recovery to people living with an owner who 
suffer personal injury. 
136 Canary Wha,JHL above n I, 694 per Lord Goff. 
137 Canary Wharf HL above n I, 719 per Lord Cooke. 
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People who live with owners ought not be able to recover for personal injury in 
private nuisance. Lord Cooke diverged from the majority on this point in two ways. 
First, he thought that direct personal injury should be available in nuisance. It has been 
shown that liability for this injury will either be the same as negligence, or it will 
offend the fault principle. 138 Professor Harris' property model cannot be relied upon to 
provide the justification for affording distributive justice to land owners. As a result, 
personal injury should only be recoverable in negligence. 
Secondly, Lord Cooke thought that the class of people able to recover should 
include all people that occupy the land as a home. However, if the owner is unable to 
recover personal injury in private nuisance, there can be no reason to permit people 
living with that owner to recover. The arguments against personal injury in private 
nuisance apply equally to owners and people who live with them. 
VII PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO LAND AND PERSONAL INJURY BELONG IN 
NEGLIGENCE 
Traditionally, private nuisance had been burdened with two functions. The first was 
to compensate for injury. Such injuries included material physical damage to land and 
personal injury. The second was to determine how much interference the law will 
permit a land owner to inflict on others. 
A Rationalising Material Physical Damage to Land and Personal Injury 
Private nuisance should no longer deal with material physical damage to land. This 
damage should be dealt with in negligence. As Professor Harris ' model of private 
property demonstrated, the introduction of reasonable foresight into nuisance aligns the 
right not to suffer property damage to land, with the general right not to be personally 
injured. The majority ' s model of nuisance indicated that the introduction of reasonable 
138 See part VI A 2. 
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foresight into private nmsance, means that there is very little practical difference 
between liability in negligence, and liability in nuisance in cases involving material 
physical damage to land. For the sake of systematic coherence, this type of damage 
ought to be subsumed into negligence. 
Further, private nmsance should no longer deal with personal injury. Personal 
injury is more appropriately dealt with in negligence. Its inclusion in private nuisance 
has been an anachronism. Permitting recovery for personal injury in private nuisance 
provides a pocket of distributive justice that cannot be justified by referring to the 
model of the institution of private property. Accordingly, all personal injury should be 
governed by negligence .. 
B Rationalising Interference with Use and Enjoyment 
If private nuisance is no longer constrained by the need to compensate material 
physical damage to land and personal injury, it can direct itself at the second function it 
is required to perform. This is, balancing the rights of people to use land against the 
rights of others not to suffer interference. Being less than material physical damage or 
personal injury, such interferences are likely to be in the nature of noxious smells, 
vibrations, dust and noise. It is mostly the case that defendants causing these types of 
interferences will not intend, but will be aware, that they are bothering their 
neighbours. The question asked of nuisance, will not be a question of determining 
liability for a wrong, but rather of determining what is a reasonable amount of 
discomfort. The reasonable user principle is ideally suited to deciding these is ues. 
However, the majority took two wrong turns in Canary Wharf. The first, was in 
finding that an interference had to emanate from the land of the defendant before it 
could be an actionable nuisance ("the emanation rule"). The second was that standing 
to bring an action in nuisance should be limited to owners. 
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VIII INTERFERENCE WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT OF LAND 
A Recovery by an Owner for Interference with Use and Enjoyment of Land 
1 The model adopted by the majority - the emanation rnle 
It was never in doubt in Canary Wha,f that owners could recover for interference 
with use and enjoyment of their rights over land. The speeches in Canary Wharf do 
nothing more than affirm what has always been the case. 
However, the majority took a wrong turn in adopting the emanation rule. Both Lord 
Goff and Lord Hoffmann began with the Blackstonian proposition that owners may 
build whatever they like on their land. 139 The Law Lords did, however, recognise that 
this principle was not unlimited. The right of land owners to build is limited by the law 
of tort. 140 In St Helens Smelting, the plaintiff bought an estate in Lancashire. 141 His 
hedges, shrubs and trees were being damaged by pollution from the defendants copper 
smelter. He brought an action in nuisance. The defendant argued that industry in the 
area would be brought to a standstill if the plaintiff was permitted to succeed. The 
House of Lords held that land owners may not use their land so as to cause material 
physical damage to the land of another. However, in cases of nuisances productive of 
sensible personal discomfort, liability will depend upon the circumstances of the place 
in which the nuisance occurs. A defendant may prevail where both the activity and 
harm were reasonable ("reasonable user principle"). 
Rather than being a defense to a claim of nuisance available to the defendant, the 
reasonable user principle sets the threshold that determines whether the harm suffered 
was actionable as a nuisance at all. The merit of this lies in its flexibility. Sometimes it 
will refer to the quality and extent of the harm suffered, other times it will refer to the 
139 Cana,y Wha,fHL above n l, 685 per Lord Goff: 709 per Lord Hoffmann. 
14° Cana,y Wha,f HL above n l, 709 per Lord Hoffmann. The right to build is also limited by covenant 
or by the acquisition, by grant or prescription, of an easement. It is also limited by town planning laws. 
141 St Helen Smelting Co v Tipping above n30. 
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activity undertaken by the defendant. 142 For example the reasonableness principle in 
Canary Wharf permits the court to balance the interference with television signals 
against the benefits of having the tower. 
Where the majority went wrong was m setting a bright line. Nuisances that 
emanate, are permitted where they are reasonable. This policy is sound. It would be too 
restrictive to permit recovery for every effect emanating from activities undertaken on 
land. If it were not so, reasonable nuisances, such as the emanating sound of playing 
children, would be actionable. However, unreasonable nuisances that do not emanate, 
are not actionable. This policy is not sound. Gillespie argues that this rule arose 
because "the common. law evolved... to encourage and protect commercial 
enterprise. " 143 
Be that as it may, as the facts of Canary Wharf demonstrate, the rule is no longer 
appropriate. The emanation rule prevented the House of Lords from granting recovery 
without overtly considering whether the interference was reasonable. The bright line 
emanation rule favours the party using the property and causing harm. But 
unreasonable interferences should be actionable even where they do not emanate. 
2 The model advanced by Lord Cooke - reasonable user without the emanation rule 
However, Lord Cooke recognised the danger in turning the law in this direction. He 
expressed his resounding approval for the reasonable user principle observing that: 
The principle may not always conduce to tidiness, but tidiness has not had a high 
priority in the history of the common law. 144 
142 G Cross "Does Only the Careless Polluter Pay" above n 134, 450. 
143 J Gillepie "Private Nuisance as a Means of Protecting Views from Obstruction" ( 1989) Envtl. and 
Plan. L.J. 94. 
144 Canary WharfHL above n I, 71 l per Lord Cooke. 
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He did not countenance the emanation rule, preferring to rely on the reasonable user 
principle alone. In his view the emanation rule did not reflect the modem importance 
of television. As he observed, the public: 
might react with incredulity, and justifiably so, to the suggestion that the amenity of 
television and radio reception is fairly comparable to a view of the surroundings of 
their homes. It may be suspected that only a lawyer would think of such a suggestion. 
145 
In choosing not to apply the emanation rule, Lord Cooke chose not to structurally 
implement a preference for the user of land. Under Lord Cooke's approach land users 
can not unreasonably interfere with the amenity of a persons home, whether or not the 
activity they undertake emanates from their own. This is a more sound approach. In a 
rapidly advancing technological age the right of access to the airwaves is becoming 
increasingly important. 
B Recovery by a Person Living with an Owner for Interference with the Use and 
Enjoyment of Land 
1 The model adopted by the majority - no recovery 
The model adopted by the majority prevents people who live with an owner from 
claiming in nuisance for interference with use and enjoyment of the land. According to 
Professor Newark's postulation, nuisance is a tort exclusively directed at protecting 
rights over land. 146 The majority in Canary Wharf confirmed those protected rights as 
those of ownership or exclusive possession. 147 People who live with the owner, 
therefore, cannot rely on nuisance. 
However, their arguments for this position were not strong. Lord Goff was 
concerned that sensible arrangements involving the trade of money for the right to 
145 Canary WharfHL above n I, 719 per Lord Cooke. 
146 Newark above n73 . 
147 See part IV A . 
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continue the nuisance would become impractical where more than one person was able 
to bring an action. 148 However, this argument cannot be more than sophistry. By this 
logic co-ownership would have the same effect, and as such also ought to be excluded. 
Lord Goff was also concerned about the problem of defining the category of people 
who could bring a claim. His concern centered on the au pair girl, the lodger and the 
resident nurse. 149 However, as Lord Cooke observed: 
It would seem weak to refrain from laying down a just rule for spouses and children 
on the ground that it is not easy to know where to draw the lines regarding other 
persons.150 
The majority were also concerned not to twist nmsance so as to turn it into a 
personal tort: 
In any event, the extension of the tort in this way would transform it from a tort to land 
into a tort to the person, in which damages could be recovered in respect of something 
less serious than personal injury and the criteria for liability were founded not upon 
negligence but upon striking a balance between the interests of neighbours in the use 
of their land. This is in my opinion not an acceptable way in which to develop the law. 
151 
However, in so far as nmsance allows recovery for sensible personal discomfort, it 
already is a personal tort. That person is the owner. 
As Lord Hoffmann observed, the policy of the law is that there can be no recovery 
for personal harm less than physical injury or nervous shock. 152 This was recognised in 
Hicks v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police. 153 Lord Cooke sought to 
provide this recovery only to people in their homes. 
148 Canary WharfHL above n l, 692-693 per Lord Goff. 
149 Cana,y Wha,f HL above n I, 693 per Lord Goff. 
15° Cana,y Wha,f HL above n I, 718 per Lord Cooke. 
151 Canary WharJHL above nl, 693 per Lord Goff. 
152 Canary Wha,fHL above n I , 707 per Lord Hoffmann. 
153 
[ 1992] 2 All E.R. 65. 
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However, Lord Hoffmann expressed doubts as to whether it was possible to limit the 
action in this way: 
Once nuisance has escaped the bounds of being a tort against land, there seems no 
logic in compromise limitations, such as that proposed by the Court of Appeal in this 
case, requiring the plaintiff to have been residing on land as his or her home. 154 
Lord Hoffmann, then went on to observe that the injunction granted m 
Khorasandjian applied whether the plaintiff was at home or not. 
2 The model advanced by Lord Cooke - a stick in the bundle of rights around the 
home 
It is with respect to the standing of people living with owners to sue in nuisance for 
interference with amenities, that the model advanced by Lord Cooke is most 
significantly different to that of the majority. The difference is that, where the majority 
saw the interference limb of nuisance as a further legal mechanism for protecting 
property rights, Lord Cooke saw its merit in protecting people in their homes. As he 
observed: 
Logically it is possible to say that the right to sue for interference with the amenities of 
a home should be confined to those with proprietary interests and licensees with 
exclusive possession. o less logically the right can be accorded to all who live in the 
home. Which test should be adopted, that is to say which should be the governing 
principle, is a question of the policy of the law.155 
In the opinion of Lord Cooke, a policy that extends standing to sue in nuisance for 
interference with amenities gives better effect to widespread conceptions concerning 
the home and family. 156 There is merit in this proposition for a number of reasons. 
First, the decision in Canary Wharf on this point was not a question of either or. It 
was not a case of whether nuisance protects property or protects the home. If standing 
154 Canary Wha,f HL above n 1, 707 -708 per Lord Hoffmann. 
155 Canary Wharf HL above n 1, 717 per Lord Cooke. 
156 Cana,y Wha,f HL above n 1, 717 per Lord Cooke. 
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was extended to people who live on the premises, it could still be available to the 
owner. Therefore, the action would be available to anyone who owns the property or 
uses the property as a home. It would not diminish in any way the trespassory 
protection available the owner. 
Secondly, the more people who have standing, the greater the liability exposure of 
land owners who are not careful in the use of their land. The greater the liability 
exposure, the more care owners will take in the use of their property. 
Lastly, the home and family are deserving of protection. There are good reasons to 
construct a bundle of rights around the home. People are more offended when they 
suffer intrusions in their own homes, than they are when they suffer the same 
intrusions elsewhere. People expect to be able to rely on an independent realm of 
autonomous freedom inside their homes. As Lord Cooke rightly observed, these 
expectations are expressly recognised in international conventions such as The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 157 In Lord Cooke's view the policy of 
the law should be to reflect this expectation. The model advanced by Lord Cooke 
would permit people living with an owner to bring an action for interference with the 
use and enjoyment of the home. 
3 Professor Harris' model of the institution of property 
Professor Harris' model of the property institution provides a framework for the 
recognition of rights in the home. As Professor Harris observed, property is not a hunk 
of land, but rather a set of rules that recognise and protect the multifarious types of 
interests in land. 158 The use interests of people occupying land as a home can be 
recognised as an ownership interest for the purposes of the trespassory protection 
provided by the tort of private nuisance. Just as a neighbour's right to an easement co-
exists with the right of an owner to use and enjoy the land, so may the right to use the 
157 Canary WlzarfHL above n I, 7 I 3-714 per Lord Cooke. 
158 Harris above n43. 
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land as a home. Just as the right of an easement derives from the owner, so does the 
right to live on the land as a home. A person's right to be free of interference with the 
use and enjoyment of their home will gain recognition as a proprietary right when it is 
prescribed trespassory protection. 
IX ROMAN LAW MODEL 
The system envisioned by the majority, and supported in this paper, places all 
physical damage under one coherent principle: negligence. The goal of Lord Cooke 
was to give effect to the expectations of the community with respect to protection from 
interference with the peaceful enjoyment of the home. These are not irreconcilable 
goals. Arguably, the reason that the majority were unwilling to extend standing to 
bring an action in private nuisance beyond owners, was that they lacked a blueprint. It 
is possible to have a system that provides both. The Roman law was such a system. 
If a claim for interference with prospect was substituted for the television signals 
claim, the facts of Canary Wharf could just as easily have been heard in ancient Rome. 
Buildings and dust were the subject matter of ancient Roman actions, just as they are in 
modem England today. In this respect, Roman law had to deal with the six types of 
plaintiff that have been discussed above. 
A The Roman Law 
Roman law has lived two lives. 159 In its first life it was the law of the city of Rome 
and eventually the whole Roman Empire. During this period the Roman lawyers 
developed "an elaborately articulated system of principles abstracted from the detailed 
rules which constitute the raw material of law." 160 
159 Barry icholas Roman law (Oxford Uni versity Press, London, l 962) l (" icholas"). 
160 Nicholas above n 159, I. 
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This first life of the Roman law lasted until Emperor Justinian in the sixth century AD. 
Five and a half centuries later, the second life of Roman law began. Justinian 's law 
books came to be studied in northern Italy. From his works sprang a 'common stock' 
of legal ideas and a 'common grammar of legal thought' that influenced nearly all of 
Europe. From this influence, particularly in respect of Roman private law, Civil Law 
evolved. 161 
1 General Roman law 
Early Roman private law was characterised by two broad categories. The first 
category was the law of persons. It governed matters of status. The second category 
was the law of thing-or res. 162 
Res were essentially economic assets. Roman law recognised two types of 
economic asset. The first was property. The second were obligations owed. The latter 
made up the law of obligations. The law of property included all rem actions. 163 The 
law of obligations included all personam actions. The law of obligations was further 
subdivided into contractus and delict. 164 
The Roman law did not have a claim like nuisance. The Romans kept the two 
functions performed by private nuisance separate. Wrongs were the subject of the law 
of delict. Use privileges were the subject of the law of property. The latter were 
governed by a complex body of rules involving usufructs, servitudes and a set of 
interdicts. 
161 Nicholas above n 159, 2. 
162 icholas above n 159, 98. 
163 icholas above n 159, 98. 
164 Nicholas above n\59, 158. 
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B Material Physical Damage to Land 
If land damage had occurred, a Roman land owner used delict. Where damage was 
yet to occur, the land owner used a property interdict. 
1 Damages in Delict 
Physical damage to property could be recovered by invoking Damnum iniuria 
datum or 'loss wrongfully caused.' 165 This action consisted of four elements. The first 
was the application of force. Initially force had to be direct but indirect force and 
omissions were later sufficient. The second element was iniuria or lack of justification. 
This amounted to fault. It included both intent and negligence. The third element was 
damnum or 'loss.' Lastly the plaintiff had to be able to show title. As a result, land 
owners who suffered material physical damage to land as a result of dust in Canary 
Wharf could have recovered under this delict. 166 People living with land owners would 
not have been able to recover. 
C Recovery For Personal Injury 
Personal injury was governed by delict. The Roman law of delict permitted 
plaintiffs to recover for personal injury by invoking iniuria, whether or not the injury 
occurred on the owners land. 167 It was a property independent prohibition. This delict 
was available only where the injury was inflicted intentionally. 
D Recovery for Interference with Use and Enjoyment of Land 
Roman land users were able to bring actions for interferences with the use and 
enjoyment of land in both the law of delict and the law of property. 
165 Nicholas above n 159, 218. 
166 icholas above nl59, 215. 
167 Nicholas above nl59, 215. 
THE VIEW OF PRIVATE NUISANCE FROM CANARY WHARF 51 
1 Delict 
Owners who suffered interference with the use and enjoyment of their land may 
also have been able to rely on the delict of iniuria. Iniuria translates to 'insult' or 
'outrage.' However, the scope of this tort was more akin to actions that disregard 
another's rights or personality. As Nicholas observed "it was ... lniuria to interfere 
with his [the owners] use of his property or to enter unauthorised into his house or onto 
his land." 168 
Therefore, this action was only available to property owners. The act had to be 
intentional. 
2 Property interdicts 
In general the property interdicts were directed at preventing actual damage from 
being done. Occasionally one provided compensation for actual damage that had been 
done. As Romy observed: 
All these proceedings rest chiefly on the natural claim of an owner or other interested 
person, that his neighbours or others shall not interfere injuriously with his land, nor 
work their own land, or so omit to repair their buildings, as to put the former to 
1 ·1 169 unnecessary oss or pen . 
On the facts of Canary Wharf, three are relevant. 
The first was, Interdictem Quad Vi Aut Clam. This was an action to secure a 
remedy, or compensation, for injury done by the building or works of neighbours in 
defiance of an objection. 170 An objector did not need to possess a right in the land 
168 Nicholas above n I 59, 216. 
169 Henry John Roby Roman Private law in the times of Cicero and of the Antonines (VI, University 
Press, Cambridge, 1902) 509 ("Roby"). 
170 Roby above n 169, 520. 
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being protected to object. An objection could be given orally, formally in front of 
witnesses, or by a symbolic act. Once notice was given, work had to cease until the 
parties were heard by a praetor (judge). Any work on or connected with land came 
within the interdict. The action was available whether the work was in still in progress 
or had been completed. Once notice was given, the party undertaking the building had 
to prove that he or she had a right to interfere with the property in question. 171 
Damages were given if the notice was ignored. They were determined in accordance 
with the interest of the plaintiff. The aim was to put plaintiffs in the position they 
would have been in if the work had not been done. 
The second proceedi,ng, Operis Novi Nuntiatio, was only available to an owner. 
This proceeding was available to owners who anticipated interference with their rights 
as a result of new work undertaken by the defendant. 172 The work had to be the 
construction or demolition of a building. Notice had to be given to the defendant or 
their agent while at the location of the disputed work. Once defendants were given 
notice, they could either suspend work while they prove their right, or give security 
and let the objector prove a right of their own. 
The third action was Uti Possideti. This proceeding was available to plaintiffs 
whose activities on their own ground are interfered with by a neighbour. 173 The action 
provided protection from an encroachment upon the plaintiffs possession. Once 
invoked the party encroaching had to prove a right. 
Anyone interested in stopping work undertaken by a neighbour, was able to rely on 
the interdict of Quad vi aut clam. The objector was not required to give reasons . The 
interdict focused on whether the builder had a right. An objection could be made 
because the building interfered with the use and enjoyment of the home. Land users 
171 Roby above nl69, 521. 
172 Roby above n l 69, 517-518. 
173 Roby above nl69, 524. 
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could also rely on uti possiditis for encroachment upon possession as this covered 
encroachments less than material physical damage. 
D General Comment 
In the Roman law, Delict dealt with compensating wrongs. The balancing and 
protecting of property rights in land were dealt with in the law of property. With 
respect to damage to land, the delict of Damnum iniuria datum could be relied on if the 
damage was intentional or negligent. In the case of personal injury, the same liability 
criterion applied whether the wrong was committed on the plaintiffs land or on the 
public highway. The delict of iniuria provided recovery only where the damage was 
intentional. 
With respect to balancing property rights, the Romans developed a complex body 
of property rules involving usufructs, prescription, servitudes and a collection of 
interdicts to support them. A few interdicts have been mentioned. Mostly these rules 
where concerned with determining, and vindicating rights over land. Occasionally, one 
of the interdicts provided a compensatory remedy for harm to the land, but this was the 
exception. 
However, the number of uses land could be put to, and the consequence on 
neighbours were limited in Roman times. Such a system lacks practicality in the fast 
moving, industrialised, society of today where any number of uses could potentially 
annoy a neighbour. The reasonable user principle in nuisance is a clearly superior legal 
mechanism. The one principle permits the court to balance the right of plaintiffs to be 
free of interference with the right of defendant to use their land as they see fit. People 
using land may reasonably interfere with their neighbours without the necessity of 
proving a servitude. 
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The value of the Roman Law model is that it included actions directed at the rights 
of people to use their land that were available to anybody. In modem times, it would be 
going too far to permit all and sundry interested in a building to bring an action in 
private nuisance. Moreover, town planning regulations provide appropriate 
mechanisms for objections. In addition, extending the right to object to everyone would 
not give effect to the expectations of the community that Lord Cooke is concerned 
about. The private nuisance action does not have to exclude people occupying the land 
as a home. Standing to bring an action in private nuisance against interferences with 
use and enjoyment should have been extended to all who occupy the home. As Lord 
Cooke appreciated, the expectation of the community of protection from interference 
of the home ought to influence the policy of the law. 
X CONCLUSION 
In the past, private nuisance had been burdened with performing two functions: 
balancing property rights and compensating physical injuries. The former was an 
important element in the protection of property. The latter crossed into the path of 
negligence. Oceans of ink have been spilt trying to reconcile the two functions. 
The speeches of the majority m Canary Wharf have indicated that the two 
functions should be separated. This proposition has been supported in this paper. 
Professor Harris' property model has been used to demonstrate that liability for 
material physical damage to land is appropriately governed by reasonable foresight. It 
follows that this damage ought to be subsumed into negligence. Further, personal 
injury should no longer be recoverable in private nuisance. Stricter liability for 
personal injury in private nuisance prefers land owners by affording them distributive 
justice. This cannot be justified by referring to the protection of property rights. 
Reasonable foresight is the most appropriate liability criterion. Accordingly, personal 
injury ought to subsumed into negligence. 
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Once liberated from compensating injury, private nuisance can concentrate on 
balancing the rights of people to user their land against the rights of their neighbours 
not to be disturbed. It has been shown that the majority ought not have adopted the 
emanation rule. The demands of modern society require that even non emanating 
nuisances should be actionable if they are unreasonable. Further, the majority ought to 
have extended standing to all people who occupy the land as a home. This gives effect 
to the expectations of the community of protection for people in their homes. Professor 
Harris' property models demonstrates that the right of a person to use and enjoy his or 
her home, can be recognised as a proprietary right. 
In Canary Wharf, the majority speeches indicated a concern to provide the law of 
tort with a measure of systematic coherence. Lord Cooke sought to develop the law of 
tort so as to make it more reflective of the values of the community. As the Roman law 
model demonstrates, these two goals are not necessarily irreconcilable. Unfortunately, 
by not extending standing all people who occupy land as a home, the majority missed 
the opportunity to recognise and protect a right of undoubted importance. 
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